The harsh realities of Trump’s 20-point Gaza plan and what’s next
The US President has labeled himself a “peacemaker” since his return to the White House. And his 20-point proposal for Gaza really has been a move that could put truth to that label.
This 20-point plan is being sold as a roadmap to end the Gaza war, release hostages, and rebuild a shattered territory.
But out of those 20 points, some are more controversial than others, especially the “Board of Peace” part.
The plan has already divided governments, analysts, and the public.
Supporters see a comprehensive attempt to tackle security, governance, and reconstruction together.
Critics argue it is top-down, more about prestige than legitimacy, and risks embedding Gaza in a permanent trusteeship.
To understand where this could lead, one must examine the plan’s mechanics, Blair’s baggage, the likely scenarios ahead, and the alternative paths that could deliver more stability.
What Trump’s 20 points actually propose
Bringing peace to Gaza is by no means an easy task. But the 20-point “peace plan” presents a bargain.
If both sides agree, the war ends and Gaza begins a transition to stability.
Israel would halt operations, hostages would be returned within 72 hours, and prisoner releases would follow.
In return, Hamas would have to relinquish all governance roles and hand over its arsenal, while Gaza would be placed under a temporary technocratic administration supervised by an international oversight board.
This “Board of Peace” is meant to coordinate reconstruction, security, and governance. A multinational stabilization force would police Gaza while Israel gradually withdraws.
At the same time, a special economic zone would attract investment, while humanitarian aid would be delivered under international monitoring.
The plan even hints at a political horizon, with Palestinian self-determination possible if governance reforms and security benchmarks are met.
On paper, it is comprehensive, but in practice, it is deeply asymmetric. The plan puts Israeli security interests at the center, while Palestinian political aspirations are postponed indefinitely.
The criticism is that Hamas is asked to disarm and exit politics without guarantees for long-term sovereignty.
Much depends on outside guarantors, monitors, and money. Without credibility on the ground, the most detailed points risk being irrelevant.
Why Tony Blair is radioactive
The choice of Tony Blair as a senior figure on the Board of Peace illustrates the gap between Western calculations and local perception.
For Trump and Netanyahu, Blair offers experience, diplomatic connections, and the cachet of a former prime minister.
He served as envoy for the Middle East Quartet from 2007 to 2015 and has maintained close ties with Gulf leaders and Western capitals.
For Palestinians and much of the Arab world, Blair is remembered very differently.
He was the most loyal ally of George W. Bush during the Iraq invasion in 2003, a war that left hundreds of thousands dead and destabilized the region for a generation.
As Quartet envoy, his tenure produced little progress beyond business initiatives, while settlements expanded and political negotiations stalled.
His later work as a consultant to Gulf monarchies reinforced the image of a man tied to elite interests rather than grassroots legitimacy.
Involving Blair risks poisoning the project before it begins. Hamas will portray him as proof that Gaza is being placed under Western trusteeship instead of being liberated.
Arab governments, even if they currently appear supportive, will find it hard to sell Blair’s role to their publics.
His presence gives opponents of the plan an easy target, turning the debate into a rerun of Iraq-era interventionism rather than a discussion about Gaza’s future.
What are the most likely outcomes?
The most likely outcome is partial implementation without Hamas buy-in.
Israel uses the plan’s framework to push hostage exchanges and some prisoner releases.
Reconstruction starts in selected “liberated areas” under heavy supervision, while Hamas refuses disarmament and retains influence in other pockets. The Board of Peace exists largely on paper, and Gaza remains divided.
This would fit the pattern of incremental deals that fall short of a true settlement.
Another strong possibility is political paralysis inside Israel.
Netanyahu’s coalition partners reject even the faint suggestion of a Palestinian political horizon.
Under pressure, Netanyahu focuses only on hostage swaps, leaving the wider elements frozen. This keeps the plan alive in name but not in execution.
A third path would be a short ceasefire and partial prisoner exchanges, followed by relapse into violence.
Without credible guarantees, both sides will suspect bad faith and return to military logic. The details of the plan would matter less than the mistrust surrounding them.
A negotiated acceptance with modifications is harder but not impossible.
Hamas could be offered a face-saving exit, perhaps through technocratic governance that includes non-Hamas Palestinian figures, paired with clear timelines for reconstruction.
This would require serious third-party guarantors, not just a Trump-led board.
The February assessment underscored that Gaza’s economy shrank by more than 80% in 2024, with unemployment at 80% and nearly the entire population living in multidimensional poverty.
Without immediate large-scale injections of aid and governance structures that people trust, no negotiated settlement can hold.
The outside chance is that a UN-anchored, Arab-financed framework overtakes Trump’s proposal.
Arab states are already discussing how to rebuild Gaza through formal channels, and the cost of reconstruction, estimated at over $50 billion, makes their role indispensable.
Housing alone requires more than $15 billion, while health and education each need billions in the early years.
The sheer scale means no plan without Arab capital and UN coordination can meet even the most basic needs.
If Washington and Jerusalem push too hard on a Trump-centric board, donors may redirect their money toward an alternative track.
What could be done differently
Ultimately, any outcome will collide with realities laid bare in the February report, which is that of a collapsed economy, almost universal food insecurity, and over 700,000 children out of school.
A political deal that does not address these fundamentals risks being another paper agreement detached from the lives of 2 million Gazans.
The structure of Donald Trump’s plan prioritizes external prestige over local legitimacy.
A more workable framework would start by broadening the ownership.
Instead of a Board of Peace chaired by Trump with Blair at his side, the transition should be anchored in a UN mandate with Arab League co-ownership.
Countries like Egypt, Qatar, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia already act as mediators and funders. Giving them formal seats at the table would improve buy-in.
And leadership is crirtical for everyone.
Figures like Sigrid Kaag, the UN coordinator for Gaza reconstruction, or respected Arab technocrats would carry far more credibility than Blair.
A co-chair arrangement, pairing an international technocrat with an Arab counterpart, would look less like trusteeship and more like partnership. That alone could make Palestinian acceptance more likely.
Financing should be professionalized. A World Bank–UN multi-donor trust fund, with the Islamic Development Bank as co-trustee, would reassure both Western donors and Gulf financiers.
Publishing every contract and procurement record would help convince Palestinians that reconstruction is not another corrupt scheme.
Early wins are also required. Cash-for-work schemes, quick repairs to water and power, and standardized housing solutions can put money in Gazan pockets and show tangible change within months.
Security must be reciprocal. Instead of demanding total disarmament before any political discussion, a phased “security for security” approach would tie Hamas’s reductions in capability to verified Israeli withdrawals and easing of movement restrictions.
Arab-led policing under UN oversight, rather than a broad NATO-style force, would be more acceptable locally while still addressing Israel’s security concerns.
Finally, the plan needs an end-state. Palestinians will not accept endless provisional arrangements.
Even if the timeline is long, the framework must commit to integrating Gaza’s transition into a wider political track that includes the West Bank and a credible horizon for statehood.
Without that, every reconstruction dollar will sit on unstable ground. That is the difference between a paper plan and one that stands a chance of surviving the battlefield and the politics that follow.
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The harsh realities of Trump’s 20-point Gaza plan and what’s next
The US President has labeled himself a “peacemaker” since his return to the White House. And his 20-point proposal for Gaza really has been a move that could put truth to that label.
This 20-point plan is being sold as a roadmap to end the Gaza war, release hostages, and rebuild a shattered territory.
But out of those 20 points, some are more controversial than others, especially the “Board of Peace” part.
The plan has already divided governments, analysts, and the public.
Supporters see a comprehensive attempt to tackle security, governance, and reconstruction together.
Critics argue it is top-down, more about prestige than legitimacy, and risks embedding Gaza in a permanent trusteeship.
To understand where this could lead, one must examine the plan’s mechanics, Blair’s baggage, the likely scenarios ahead, and the alternative paths that could deliver more stability.
What Trump’s 20 points actually propose
Bringing peace to Gaza is by no means an easy task. But the 20-point “peace plan” presents a bargain.
If both sides agree, the war ends and Gaza begins a transition to stability.
Israel would halt operations, hostages would be returned within 72 hours, and prisoner releases would follow.
In return, Hamas would have to relinquish all governance roles and hand over its arsenal, while Gaza would be placed under a temporary technocratic administration supervised by an international oversight board.
This “Board of Peace” is meant to coordinate reconstruction, security, and governance. A multinational stabilization force would police Gaza while Israel gradually withdraws.
At the same time, a special economic zone would attract investment, while humanitarian aid would be delivered under international monitoring.
The plan even hints at a political horizon, with Palestinian self-determination possible if governance reforms and security benchmarks are met.
On paper, it is comprehensive, but in practice, it is deeply asymmetric. The plan puts Israeli security interests at the center, while Palestinian political aspirations are postponed indefinitely.
The criticism is that Hamas is asked to disarm and exit politics without guarantees for long-term sovereignty.
Much depends on outside guarantors, monitors, and money. Without credibility on the ground, the most detailed points risk being irrelevant.
Why Tony Blair is radioactive
The choice of Tony Blair as a senior figure on the Board of Peace illustrates the gap between Western calculations and local perception.
For Trump and Netanyahu, Blair offers experience, diplomatic connections, and the cachet of a former prime minister.
He served as envoy for the Middle East Quartet from 2007 to 2015 and has maintained close ties with Gulf leaders and Western capitals.
For Palestinians and much of the Arab world, Blair is remembered very differently.
He was the most loyal ally of George W. Bush during the Iraq invasion in 2003, a war that left hundreds of thousands dead and destabilized the region for a generation.
As Quartet envoy, his tenure produced little progress beyond business initiatives, while settlements expanded and political negotiations stalled.
His later work as a consultant to Gulf monarchies reinforced the image of a man tied to elite interests rather than grassroots legitimacy.
Involving Blair risks poisoning the project before it begins. Hamas will portray him as proof that Gaza is being placed under Western trusteeship instead of being liberated.
Arab governments, even if they currently appear supportive, will find it hard to sell Blair’s role to their publics.
His presence gives opponents of the plan an easy target, turning the debate into a rerun of Iraq-era interventionism rather than a discussion about Gaza’s future.
What are the most likely outcomes?
The most likely outcome is partial implementation without Hamas buy-in.
Israel uses the plan’s framework to push hostage exchanges and some prisoner releases.
Reconstruction starts in selected “liberated areas” under heavy supervision, while Hamas refuses disarmament and retains influence in other pockets. The Board of Peace exists largely on paper, and Gaza remains divided.
This would fit the pattern of incremental deals that fall short of a true settlement.
Another strong possibility is political paralysis inside Israel.
Netanyahu’s coalition partners reject even the faint suggestion of a Palestinian political horizon.
Under pressure, Netanyahu focuses only on hostage swaps, leaving the wider elements frozen. This keeps the plan alive in name but not in execution.
A third path would be a short ceasefire and partial prisoner exchanges, followed by relapse into violence.
Without credible guarantees, both sides will suspect bad faith and return to military logic. The details of the plan would matter less than the mistrust surrounding them.
A negotiated acceptance with modifications is harder but not impossible.
Hamas could be offered a face-saving exit, perhaps through technocratic governance that includes non-Hamas Palestinian figures, paired with clear timelines for reconstruction.
This would require serious third-party guarantors, not just a Trump-led board.
The February assessment underscored that Gaza’s economy shrank by more than 80% in 2024, with unemployment at 80% and nearly the entire population living in multidimensional poverty.
Without immediate large-scale injections of aid and governance structures that people trust, no negotiated settlement can hold.
The outside chance is that a UN-anchored, Arab-financed framework overtakes Trump’s proposal.
Arab states are already discussing how to rebuild Gaza through formal channels, and the cost of reconstruction, estimated at over $50 billion, makes their role indispensable.
Housing alone requires more than $15 billion, while health and education each need billions in the early years.
The sheer scale means no plan without Arab capital and UN coordination can meet even the most basic needs.
If Washington and Jerusalem push too hard on a Trump-centric board, donors may redirect their money toward an alternative track.
What could be done differently
Ultimately, any outcome will collide with realities laid bare in the February report, which is that of a collapsed economy, almost universal food insecurity, and over 700,000 children out of school.
A political deal that does not address these fundamentals risks being another paper agreement detached from the lives of 2 million Gazans.
The structure of Donald Trump’s plan prioritizes external prestige over local legitimacy.
A more workable framework would start by broadening the ownership.
Instead of a Board of Peace chaired by Trump with Blair at his side, the transition should be anchored in a UN mandate with Arab League co-ownership.
Countries like Egypt, Qatar, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia already act as mediators and funders. Giving them formal seats at the table would improve buy-in.
And leadership is crirtical for everyone.
Figures like Sigrid Kaag, the UN coordinator for Gaza reconstruction, or respected Arab technocrats would carry far more credibility than Blair.
A co-chair arrangement, pairing an international technocrat with an Arab counterpart, would look less like trusteeship and more like partnership. That alone could make Palestinian acceptance more likely.
Financing should be professionalized. A World Bank–UN multi-donor trust fund, with the Islamic Development Bank as co-trustee, would reassure both Western donors and Gulf financiers.
Publishing every contract and procurement record would help convince Palestinians that reconstruction is not another corrupt scheme.
Early wins are also required. Cash-for-work schemes, quick repairs to water and power, and standardized housing solutions can put money in Gazan pockets and show tangible change within months.
Security must be reciprocal. Instead of demanding total disarmament before any political discussion, a phased “security for security” approach would tie Hamas’s reductions in capability to verified Israeli withdrawals and easing of movement restrictions.
Arab-led policing under UN oversight, rather than a broad NATO-style force, would be more acceptable locally while still addressing Israel’s security concerns.
Finally, the plan needs an end-state. Palestinians will not accept endless provisional arrangements.
Even if the timeline is long, the framework must commit to integrating Gaza’s transition into a wider political track that includes the West Bank and a credible horizon for statehood.
Without that, every reconstruction dollar will sit on unstable ground. That is the difference between a paper plan and one that stands a chance of surviving the battlefield and the politics that follow.
The post The harsh realities of Trump's 20-point Gaza plan and what's next appeared first on Invezz
Read More
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